JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

No. 501

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A.G.,
Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

ALLEN F. MAULSBY
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10005

ARNOLD M. LERMAN
MAX O. TRUITT, JR.
DANIEL K. MAYERS
900 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Attorneys for Appellant

Of Counsel:

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10005

WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING
900 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Petitioner Farbenfabriken Bayer A.G. ("Bayer") appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia entered on May 10, 1968, as amended by a judgment entered on May 14, 1968, both of which denied the motion of Bayer for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that process and service thereof were insufficient to bring Bayer before the court. Bayer submits this statement to show that this Court has jurisdiction of this appeal and that a substantial question is presented.

OPINION BELOW

The district court did not write an opinion. A copy of the order entered on May 10, 1968 (R. 18),* is annexed hereto as Appendix A. A copy of the judgment of May 14, 1968 (R. 23), amending that order is annexed hereto as Appendix B.

JURISDICTION

This action was brought by the United States to enjoin Bayer and one of its subsidiaries, Chemagro Corporation ("Chemagro"), from continuing certain contracts and practices alleged to violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (R. 1). Process was served by mail upon Bayer at its offices in Leverkusen, West Germany, purportedly under the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 293 (R. 5).

Before answer, Bayer moved to dismiss the complaint as to it on the ground that 35 U.S.C. § 293 did not authorize the issuance of process against it in this action, and that, therefore, the district court had not acquired personal jurisdiction over it (R. 14). The district court denied the motion by order entered on May 10, 1962. On May 14, 1968, the district court entered a judgment amending that order.**

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* References to "R. ——" are to the certified record of the district court, a copy of which has been filed in this Court.

** The amendment, made at Bayer's request, included findings that the decision involved a controlling question of law as to which there was substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal might materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Relying on the

On June 8, 1968, Bayer filed its notice of appeal to this Court from the judgment of the district court (R. 27). On July 26, 1968, this Court extended to September 11, 1968, the time within which Bayer might docket this appeal.

The jurisdiction of this Court to review the order and judgment of the district court by direct appeal is conferred by Section 2 of the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29. The following decisions, among others, of this Court sustain this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal: *Brown Shoe Co.* v. *United States*, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); *Local 438, Construction Laborers* v. *Curry*, 371 U.S. 542 (1963); *Mercantile National Bank* v. *Langdeau*, 371 U.S. 555 (1963).*

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findings in that judgment (see Rule 54(a), Fed. R. Civ. Proc.), Bayer filed a timely application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) for leave to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. On June 25, 1968, the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal.

Because the question presented by the decision of the district court is a substantial federal question of first impression, Bayer is attempting to follow all available appellate remedies. It is, therefore, concurrently with the filing of this jurisdictional statement, filing a petition for certiorari pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) directed to the court of appeals and petitions for writs of common law certiorari directed both to the court of appeals and to the district court.

* In determining whether a lower court judgment is "final" for purposes of appeal under the Expediting Act, this Court has adopted a practical approach designed to achieve a "just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action" as provided in Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. *Brown Shoe Co.* v. *United States*, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962). Decisions "finally and erroneously asserting . . . jurisdiction" which are "wholly separate from and independent of the

QUESTION PRESENTED

Section 293 of the Patent Code authorizes service of process upon a patentee not residing in the United States with respect to "proceedings affecting the patent or rights thereunder . . . ." The question presented by this appeal is whether that section permits service of process on a non-resident patentee in an antitrust action brought by the United States which challenges neither the validity nor the patentee's use of the patent, and where, on the other hand, the complaint affirmatively states that the conduct complained of is not covered by the patent.

STATUTE INVOLVED

The statute involved is 35 U.S.C. § 293, which provides as follows:

> "Every patentee not residing in the United States may file in the Patent Office a written designation stating the name and address of a person residing within the United States on whom may be served process or notice of proceedings affecting the patent or rights thereunder. If the person designated cannot be found at the address given in the last designation, or if no person has been designated, the United States

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merits . . ." of a case are "final" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257, *Local 438, Construction Laborers* v. *Curry*, 371 U.S. 542, 548 (1963), and should be considered "final" for purposes of the Expediting Act. See also *Mercantile National Bank* v. *Langdeau*, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963) holding "final" under Section 1257 a venue decision because it was a "separate and independent matter anterior to the merits . . ." of the case.

District Court for the District of Columbia shall have jurisdiction and summons shall be served by publication or otherwise as the court directs. The court shall have the same jurisdiction to take any action respecting the patent or rights thereunder that it would have if the patentee were personally within the jurisdiction of the court."

STATEMENT

This suit concerns a novel and unprecedented attempt by the Department of Justice to commence an antitrust action in the District of Columbia against a foreign corporation not found within the jurisdiction by serving process under a little used provision of the Patent Code.

This is a civil antitrust action brought by the United States pursuant to Section 4 of the Sherman Act. There are two named defendants—Bayer and Chemagro. Bayer is a West German corporation (R. 1). It is not found within, it does not transact business within, and it is not licensed to transact business within the District of Columbia. Chemagro is a New York corporation with its principal place of business in Kansas City, Missouri. (R. 1, ¶ 4).*

Bayer is the owner of United States Patent No. 2,759,010 (the "Bayer patent"). The Bayer patent covers the manufacture of a chemical compound known as diethyl, a highly toxic substance used in the manufacture of certain insecticides. Bayer has

* Although Chemagro is a wholly owned subsidiary of Bayer, this fact does not appear germane to the Government's attempt to serve Bayer with process under Section 293.

granted Chemagro an exclusive license under the Bayer patent to make, use and sell diethyl within the United States (R. 1).

The complaint alleges that Chemagro has entered into contracts under which it agrees to sell diethyl and to grant the purchaser a limited license under the patent to use or resell diethyl only in certain restricted ways. Those agreements between Chemagro and its customers are alleged to violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

The complaint does not allege that Bayer has entered into any such contracts or licensing agreements. Rather, in paragraph 10 it alleges that Bayer has "combined" with Chemagro and "participated" in Chemagro's violation by (1) granting Chemagro an exclusive license, (2) deriving revenue from Chemagro's contracts, and (3) its control of Chemagro. However, by alleging that Bayer has granted Chemagro an exclusive license * under the Bayer patent the Government appears to acknowledge that Bayer has no rights in the United States under its patent. Moreover, the complaint avers that the conduct the Government complains of is not within the scope of the patent—indeed, it avers that the patent does not even "purport" to cover that conduct (R. 1, ¶ 7).

Process was served by mail upon Bayer at its offices in Leverkusen, West Germany, purportedly under the

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* It is undisputed that Chemagro has the exclusive right to make, use and sell diethyl in the United States, that Bayer does not make, use or sell diethyl in the United States, and that Chemagro exercises responsibility for the marketing of diethyl in the United States (R. 14, Ex. A).

provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 293, which authorizes service upon foreign patent owners only in proceedings "affecting the patent or rights thereunder." Since the complaint alleged that Bayer's patent neither covered nor purported to cover the allegedly illegal conduct and, in any event, since Bayer had no rights under the patent, Bayer moved to dismiss the complaint as to it on the ground that Section 293 did not authorize the issuance of process against it in this action (R. 14). And, since Bayer was not in any way "present" within the District of Columbia, it urged that the district court had no other basis for asserting *in personam* jurisdiction over it. It is the denial of that motion to dismiss which Bayer brings before this Court.

THE QUESTION IS SUBSTANTIAL

In denying appellant's motion to dismiss, the district court decided a novel and substantial federal question of first impression. For the first time since its enactment in 1952, a little used section of the Patent Code, intended to enable process in suits "affecting" United States patents or "rights thereunder" to reach non-resident patent owners, has been used as the sole basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in an action not arising under the patent laws.* Such an interpretation is wholly at

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* This case is actually one of two antitrust actions of which we are aware that have been commenced by service under Section 293. See *United States* v. *Glaxo Group*, Civil Action No. 558-68, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, *leave to appeal denied*, Misc. No. 3261, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

odds with Congress' clear intent in enacting a provision for serving process in patent actions. If the decision is permitted to stand, Section 293 will have undergone an instant expansion whereby process can be served on any foreign patentee in any Government antitrust case in which there can be made any colorable allegation that a patent is in any way involved.

If this provision of the Patent Code is now to be used by the Government in antitrust cases to bring foreign defendants not otherwise amenable to process within the district court's jurisdiction, that issue ought to be decided by this Court and not by a single judge in an order unaccompanied by explanation or written opinion.

Not only is the district court's decision novel and unprecedented, it is also inconsistent with the legislative history of the section, and contrary to the cases heretofore decided under it. Moreover, it constitutes an unwarranted and unauthorized expansion of the antitrust jurisdiction of United States courts over persons not "present" within the United States. Finally, the construction of Section 293 adopted by the district court raises serious constitutional questions.

This case does not arise under any Act of Congress relating to patents; * the complaint does not allege in-

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(1968). In *Glaxo*, however, the Government challenged the validity of one of the patents involved and, as part of the relief, sought a declaration of the patent's invalidity. Thus *Glaxo* does not raise the same issues with regard to the application of Section 293 as are present in this case.

* District courts have jurisdiction of such cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).

fringement, interference, or any other cause of action under the patent laws.* There is neither any allegation nor any relief sought "affecting the patent." And, the admission in the complaint that the patent does not purport to cover the conduct complained of makes clear that the proceeding does not even affect Bayer's "rights thereunder."

Considerations of both justice and efficiency require that the judgment of the district court, denying Bayer's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, be reviewed at this time.** Surely Bayer should not be required to produce documents, engage in costly pretrial preparation, and suffer the vicissitudes of protracted litigation if it is correct in its claim that the district court lacks jurisdiction. And it seems equally clear that the efficiency of the judicial process is not enhanced by requiring an already beleaguered district court to go through the time-consuming process of a full-scale antitrust trial when it may well be that the whole proceeding will go for

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* 35 U.S.C. §§ 281-93.

** It is not unusual for this Court to hear, in such circumstances, questions that determine whether persons should be parties to Government antitrust suits before the action has gone its full course to final judgment. For example, this Court took jurisdiction to determine whether a would-be intervenor should be allowed to participate in an antitrust suit before the trial court had completed its action. *Cascade Natural Gas Corp.* v. *El Paso Natural Gas Co.*, 386 U.S. 129 (1967). See also *Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co.* v. *United States*, 389 U.S. 580 (1968), affirming a district court denial of leave to intervene in a Government antitrust action.

naught because of the court's initial lack of jurisdiction over Bayer.*

1. Section 293 was enacted in 1952 as part of the general revision and codification of the patent laws. Both its legislative history and the reported decisions interpreting it demonstrated beyond serious question that the section was intended to create a method theretofore unavailable for serving process upon non-resident patentees only in actions arising under the patent laws.

Every aspect of the statute indicates that it was intended to relate only to the patent laws. The section is part of the Patent Code; if it had been intended by Congress to be a general jurisdictional statute,

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* Because of the presence of Chemagro in this litigation, the use by the Government of Section 293 to serve process on Bayer causes additional distortion of the judicial process. Only the United States District Court for the District of Columbia could issue process in this case against Bayer under Section 293, and, therefore, suit could be brought against Bayer only in that District. Because of the pendency of the action in the district court, the Government was then permitted to service process upon Chemagro in Kansas City under the provisions of Section 5 of the Sherman Act. If Bayer were not a party to the litigation, Chemagro could not be sued in the District of Columbia because it has no connection with this District, and the venue of this action would probably be in Kansas City, Chemagro's principal place of business. Thus, the domestic corporation, which is the exclusive licensee, is forced to defend itself 1,500 miles from its principal place of business; and both it and Bayer are compelled to litigate in a forum which has no conceivable connection with either. Moreover, if Bayer is correct that it was not subject to service of process under Section 293, then Chemagro cannot validly be tried in the District of Columbia and any proceeding here would be useless.

it presumably would have been located in the Judicial Code, Title 28. Moreover, Section 293 is the last section of Chapter 29, a chapter devoted to "Remedies for Infringement of Patent and Other Actions," and consisting of Sections 281 through 293. Thus, it seems obvious that the section should be construed in the context of that chapter, all of which relates to actions under the patent laws.

The legislative history reaffirms this obvious construction. The Senate Report on the bill (H.R. 7794, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1952)) opened its discussion of Chapter 29 with the following explanation:

> "Beginning with 281 is a group of sections relating to remedy for infringement of a patent, the suit in the courts." S. Rep. No. 1979, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1952), p. 8. See also H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1952) p. 10.

The report goes on to describe Section 293 as:

> "a new section that is needed on some occasions to obtain jurisdiction over foreign patent owners that do not reside in the United States." *Id.* at 9. See also H.R. Rep. No. 1923, *supra*, p. 10.

The hearings bear out those statements in the report. The most common causes of action arising under the patent laws brought against patent owners are suits for declaration of non-infringement or invalidity. Such suits without question are within the jurisdiction of district courts since they "arise under" acts of Congress relating to patents. See, *e.g.*, *Edward Katzinger Co.* v. *Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co.*, 329 U.S. 394 (1947); *E. Edelmann & Co.* v. *Triple-A*

Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852, 854 (7th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 300 U.S. 680 (1937). It was precisely that type of action to which the Executive Branch wished the substituted-service provision of Section 293 to apply. In commenting upon a provision of H.R. 3760 that was identical with the present Section 293, the State Department noted its understanding:

> "that this provision has been added for the benefit of American residents desiring to bring action against foreign owners of United States patents. At the present time American manufacturers threatened by charges of infringement of United States patents by persons resident abroad are especially handicapped by the inability to bring suit for declaratory judgment." Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. on H.R. 3760, p. 91.

The Department of Justice confirmed this view of the statute. *Id.* at 98.

Thus, the legislative history underscores the plain meaning of the language of the section: the section is applicable only to actions under the patent laws—those for declaratory judgments for infringement or invalidity. There is no suggestion anywhere in the history that the section authorizes service upon nonresident patent owners in tax cases, or food and drug act cases, or antitrust cases, or, indeed, any cases merely because the income, product or business involved derives from a patent. It authorizes service only in cases that arise under the patent laws.

2. We have found no reported decision in which Section 293 was used as a basis for service of process except cases under the patent laws.* The judgment of the district court thus rests on an interpretation of Section 293 that is inconsistent not only with the legislative history of the section but with its prior judicial construction. In *North Branch Prod., Inc.* v. *Fisher*, 179 F. Supp. 843 (D.D.C.), *reversed on other grounds*, 109 U.S. App. D.C. 182, 284 F.2d 611 (1960), *cert. denied*, 365 U.S. 827 (1961), the district court below limited the application of the statute to cases "under the patent laws." Plaintiff there was a Michigan corporation that had sued a non-resident patentee for a declaratory judgment adjudicating that certain patents and patent applications were owned by it and not by the defendant. Such a case, founded in contract and not in patent rights created by Congress, does not "arise under" the patent laws. See *Wade* v. *Lawder*, 165 U.S. 624 (1897). The defendant had been served by publication pursuant to Section 293. It moved to quash such service and to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court, although finding that the defend-

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* See *Abington Textile Mach. Works* v. *Carding Specialists (Canada), Ltd.*, 249 F. Supp. 823, 827 (D.D.C. 1965); *Scandia House Enterprises, Inc.* v. *Dam Things Establishment*, 243 F. Supp. 450, 451 (D.D.C. 1965); *Sealol Corp.* v. *Flexibox Ltd.*, 242 F. Supp. 693, 694 (D.D.C. 1965); *Etablissements Henry-Le Paute* v. *American Greiner Electronics, Inc.*, 172 F. Supp. 228, 229 (D. Conn. 1959); and *Webster-Chicago Corp.* v. *Holstensson*, 132 F. Supp. 287 (D.D.C. 1955). *Cf. Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n* v. *Ronson Corp.*, 257 F. Supp. 219 (D.N.J. 1966).

ant had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by asserting a counterclaim, observed that:

> ". . . the phrase 'proceedings affecting the patent or rights thereunder' contained in 35 U.S.C. § 293, should be construed as synonymous with 'actions under the patent laws of the United States' and, therefore, should be limited and restricted to actions for infringement of patents and actions for declaratory judgments to adjudicate the validity or infringement of patents." 179 F. Supp. at 845-46.

Petitioner submits that *North Branch* represents a correct resolution of the question and that the decision below is erroneous.

3. Clearly Section 293 was not intended to subject foreign patent owners to the general personal jurisdiction of United States courts. By its terms, the statute is limited to actions "affecting the patent or rights thereunder." Nonetheless, the position of the Government, adopted by the court below, expands the section's coverage to such an extent that any connection between a patent and a cause of action—however remote—may be sufficient to bring a foreign patent owner within the jurisdiction of the District Court for the District of Columbia. Such an interpretation not only ignores clear language and plain Congressional purpose, it also raises serious constitutional doubts as to whether such a broad jurisdictional claim squares with that process due litigants under the Fifth Amendment.

The only "act" which connects Bayer in any way with the District of Columbia is its ownership of a

United States patent. In this case, the validity of that patent is not challenged; nor is the validity of the exclusive license to Chemagro (representing the "rights thereunder") brought into question by the complaint. Indeed, the complaint itself asserts that the very conduct alleged to violate the antitrust laws is not within the scope of the patent—that such conduct by Chemagro is not an exercise of any right of Bayer "under" the patent. To subject Bayer to the jurisdiction of the court in these circumstances clearly offends those "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" which the Fifth Amendment guarantees to litigants. *International Shoe Co.* v. *Washington*, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

Except in a limited class of cases, the Due Process clause prohibits a court from exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-resident not having "minimal contacts" with the jurisdiction. The exception involves the conditioning of some right on an implied agreement that the person receiving the benefit will be amenable to service in cases arising directly out of the exercise of the right or the receipt of the benefit. Thus a non-resident motorist will be subject to an in personam action which arises as a result of his use of an automobile on the streets of a foreign jurisdiction.* *See, e.g., Hess* v. *Pawloski*, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).

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* However, the fact that he once drove on the streets will not subject him to the jurisdiction of the courts in unrelated actions, for example, contract actions.

There is no allegation of the complaint that Bayer is "found" within the District of Columbia, or that it has offices there, employs salesmen, takes orders, transacts business, or otherwise has *any* contact with the District of Columbia.

Thus, the assertion of jurisdiction must be based on the theory that Bayer, by owning a United States patent, has availed itself of certain benefits of United States law and has, in return therefor, impliedly agreed to subject itself to jurisdiction in suits arising from such benefits. But, as this Court has made clear, where the defendant is not found within the jurisdiction the connection between the alleged benefit and the act complained of must be apparent. As was true in *Hanson* v. *Denckla*, 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958), the present "suit cannot be said to be one to enforce an obligation that arose from a privilege that the defendant exercised" within the jurisdiction.*

The unwarranted jurisdictional expansion accomplished by the court below in effect makes foreign patent holders—doing no business in the United States—subject to suit for all sorts of actions not challenging the validity of their patents or their rights thereunder. It seems highly unlikely that Congress, in enacting a simple service of process section for suits

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* Professor Moore puts it this way:

"If there is a minimum of contacts and the cause of action does not arise out of the contacts, there will normally be no basis of jurisdiction, since it is difficult to establish the factors necessary to meet the fair and reasonable test." 2 Moore, Federal Practice, ¶ 4.25[5], p. 1173.

arising under the patent laws, intended such far-reaching results which push at the very limits of due process. Rather, the constitutional obstacles to such a broad assertion of jurisdiction reinforce the obvious and plain construction of the statute: that the phrase "affecting the patent or rights thereunder" was intended by Congress to define those actions arising under the patent laws, of which Section 293 is itself a part.

4. In ascertaining the meaning and scope of Section 293, the Court must, of course, reject any construction that reaches an unconstitutional result. The interpretation of the court below, however, raises a second issue of constitutional dimension that was recognized by the district court in *North Branch*.

It is clear that not all actions which may affect patents or rights thereunder are within the judicial power conferred by Article III of the Constitution upon the federal courts. For example, a contoversy over a contract assigning a patent does not "arise under" federal law and, absent some independent basis of federal jurisdiction, such as diversity, cannot be maintained in a federal court. *See, e.g., Wade* v. *Lawder*, 165 U.S. 624 (1897).

In enacting Section 293 Congress surely intended to stay within the boundaries of Article III. Therefore, it must have intended the words "affecting the patent or rights thereunder" to mean "arising under the patent laws." That was the conclusion reached in *North Branch*. Any contrary construction would, in some cases, purport to confer subject matter jurisdiction

beyond that authorized by Article III and would be plainly invalid.

That construction, of course, must prevail even in a case where, like this one, there is an independent ground of subject matter jurisdiction. The mere happenstance that federal jurisdiction exists in this case by virtue of the Sherman Act * is irrelevant in interpreting the scope that Congress intended for Section 293. Congress plainly did not enact Section 293 as an ancillary provision to the antitrust laws; rather, it intended it as an aid to enforcement of patent rights. Since any interpretation of "affecting the patent or rights thereunder" broader than "arising under the patent laws" would raise obvious Constitutional issues in cases where no independent basis of federal jurisdiction exists, this strict interpretation of the language must control in gauging Congress' intent. And since it is beyond dispute that this case does not "arise under" the patent laws, the use of the substituted service provided for in Section 293 was invalid.

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* Of course, if Bayer were in some way "present" or "found" within the District of Columbia, the Clayton Act itself would provide a basis for serving process and asserting personal jurisdiction over Bayer. Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22, provides that venue of an action brought under Section 4 of the Sherman Act may be laid wherever the defendant corporation is "found or transacts business," and that process may be served wherever such a defendant is "found". Section 12 permits foreign corporations, such as Bayer, to be brought personally before United States courts if and only if they have sufficient contacts within the United States to be "present" or "found" within a district. See, *e.g.*, *United States* v. *Scophony Corp.*, 333 U.S. 795 (1948).

CONCLUSION

This case involves a substantial federal question of first impression raising serious constitutional questions and important and substantial issues of statutory construction. For the reasons stated, this Court should note probable jurisdiction.

Respectfully submitted,

ALLEN F. MAULSBY
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10005

ARNOLD M. LERMAN
MAX O. TRUITT, JR.
DANIEL K. MAYERS
900 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Attorneys for Appellant

Of Counsel:

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10005

WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING
900 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Sept. 11, 1968.

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil No. 586-68

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

v.

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A. G., and CHEMAGRO CORPORATION,
Defendants.

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

1. This is an antitrust case brought by the United States against a German company, Farbenfabriken, and its American subsidiary, Chemagro, pursuant to Section 4 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 4), in order to secure declaratory and injunctive relief. In its complaint, the government asserts that defendants entered into unlawful licensing agreements with over a hundred American firms, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1). According to the complaint, such license agreements prevent competition in the sale of an important insecticide and they place unlawful restraints upon the alienation of the product by purchasers thereof.

2. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Court finds that this action is one "affecting the patent or rights thereunder" within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 293. Moreover, the relief which the government

prays for constitutes "action respecting the patent or rights thereunder" which 35 U.S.C. § 293 gives this Court the same jurisdiction to take that it would have if the patentee were personally within the jurisdiction of the Court.

The motion to dismiss is, therefore, this 10th day of May, 1968, denied.

It is so ordered.

/s/ Edward M. Curran
United States District Judge

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 586-68

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

v.

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A. G., and CHEMAGRO CORPORATION,
Defendants.

AMENDED ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

1. This is an antitrust case brought by the United States against a German company, Farbenfabriken Bayer, A.G., and its American subsidiary, Chemagro Corporation, pursuant to Section 4 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 4), in order to secure declaratory and injunctive relief. In its complaint the government asserts that Bayer owns a patent for diethyl and that the Bayer Patent does not cover or purport to cover the use of diethyl or the manner in which it is packaged or formulated for use or sale. The complaint further alleges that Bayer has granted Chemagro an exclusive license under the patent. The complaint asserts that Chemagro has entered into more than one hundred contracts in which it agrees to sell diethyl to the vendee and to grant the vendee a license under the patent with certain restrictions and limitations relating to the use and resale of the product by

the purchasers thereof. The complaint alleges that said contracts violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1), and that Chemagro and Bayer have continued and will continue said allegedly unlawful contracts in effect unless this Court grants the relief prayed for in the complaint. It alleges that Bayer combined with Chemagro and participated in said violation by granting an exclusive license to Chemagro, by deriving revenue from Chemagro's contracts, and by its control of Chemagro.

2. On the basis of the foregoing allegations, the Court concludes that this action is one affecting the patent or rights thereunder and that this Court has the same jurisdiction to take action respecting the patent or rights thereunder as it would have if the patentee were personally within the jurisdiction of this Court (35 U.S.C. § 293).

It is, therefore, this 14th day of May, 1968,

ORDERED: that the motion to dismiss is denied; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), it is the opinion of the Court that the denial of the motion to dismiss involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation.

/s/ Edward M. Curran
United States District Judge

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

No.

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A.G.,
Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

ALLEN F. MAULSBY
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10005

ARNOLD M. LERMAN
MAX O. TRUITT, JR.
DANIEL K. MAYERS
900 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE
1 Chase Manhatten Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10005

WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING
900 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Sept. 11, 1968

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Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

No.

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A.G.,
Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Petitioner Farbenfabriken Bayer A.G. ("Bayer") prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit entered in this action on June 25, 1968.

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia entered on May 10, 1968, is annexed hereto as Appendix A. A copy of the judgment of that court entered on May 14, 1968 (R. 1, App. A)*, amending such order is annexed hereto as

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* References to "R. ——" are to the certified record of the court of appeals, a copy of which has been filed in this Court.

Appendix B. The judgment of the court below, denying petitioner leave to appeal (R. 4), is not reported and is attached as Appendix C.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on June 25, 1968. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).*

QUESTION PRESENTED

The question presented is whether the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29, precludes a court of appeals from entertaining an interlocutory appeal properly certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), especially where an immediate appeal would serve the purpose of the Expediting Act by permitting prompt decision on a jurisdictional issue that might terminate the litigation without the time and expense of trial.

STATUTES INVOLVED

The statutory provisions are:

(1) Section 2 of the Expediting Act, 69 Stat. 989 (1948), 15 U.S.C. § 29, which provides:

---

* Because leave to appeal was denied by the court below, there is some question whether this case was ever "in" the court of appeals within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). See *In Re 620 Church St. Bldg. Corp.*, 299 U.S. 24 (1936). Therefore, petitioner is also seeking review of the decision below by an application, filed concurrently herewith, for a common law writ of certiorari under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). Beginning with the "Statement," the text of both documents is identical.

"In every civil action brought in any district court of the United States under any of said Acts, wherein the United States is complainant, an appeal from the final judgment of the district court will lie only to the Supreme Court."

(2) 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which provides:

"(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: *Provided, however,* That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order."

STATEMENT *

This is a civil antitrust action brought by the United States pursuant to Section 4 of the Sherman Act in the District of Columbia. There are two named

* Petitioner believes the following abbreviated statement of facts is sufficient for this petition. A more extended statement of facts is set forth in the Jurisdictional Statement and in the Petition for Writ of Common Law Certiorari, filed concurrently herewith, which seek review of the merits of the district court's order.

defendants—Bayer and Chemagro Corporation (R. 1, pp. 2-3).

Process was served by mail upon Bayer at its offices in Leverkusen, West Germany, purportedly under the authority of 35 U.S.C. § 293, a provision of the Patent Code. Bayer moved to dismiss the complaint as to it on the ground that Section 293 did not authorize the issuance of process against it in this action. And, since Bayer was not in any way "present" within the District of Columbia, it urged that the district court had no other basis for asserting *in personam* jurisdiction over it.

By order entered on May 10, 1968, the district court denied Bayer's motion. On May 14, 1968, at Bayer's request, the district court amended that order by entering a judgment including findings appropriate to permit Bayer to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b).

On May 24, 1968, Bayer timely filed in the court of appeals an application for leave to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (R. 1). Bayer's purpose was to get immediate appellate review of an issue which could terminate an otherwise long, costly and burdensome litigation. On June 25, 1968, the court of appeals, by *per curiam* order, denied leave to appeal (R. 4). It is apparent that the court of appeals did not exercise the discretion granted to it by Section 1292(b). The sole ground for denial of leave was the court of appeals' view that the Expediting Act deprived it of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.*

---

* The only cases cited in support of the denial of leave to appeal are *Brown Shoe Co.* v. *United States*, 370 U.S. 294, 305

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This petition raises a significant federal issue of first impression. It is an issue that will have considerable impact both on the conduct of Government antitrust litigation and the allocation of jurisdiction between this Court and the courts of appeals in antitrust cases. Even though this Court has many times noted the burden that the Expediting Act places upon its jurisdiction,* it has never considered whether the enactment in 1958 of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), giving the courts of appeals jurisdiction to entertain interlocutory appeals, creates a machinery for expediting the conduct of antitrust cases in conformity with the policies of the Expediting Act.

The court of appeals in this case apparently concluded that the Expediting Act, enacted at the turn of the century, overrode the clear intent of Congress

---

n.9 (1962); *United States* v. *California Cooperative Canneries*, 279 U.S. 553 (1929); and *National Association of Real Estate Boards* v. *United States*, 85 U.S. App. D.C. 165, 176 F.2d 631 (1949). Moreover, the only argument advanced by the Government in opposition to the application for leave to appeal was that the Expediting Act precluded court of appeals' review even of the threshold jurisdictional question.

* *United States* v. *Grinnell Corp.*, 384 U.S. 563, 565 (1966) (dissenting opinion); *United States* v. *Singer Mfg. Co.*, 374 U.S. 174, 175 n.1 (1963); *id.* at 202 (dissenting opinion); *Brown Shoe Co.* v. *United States*, 370 U.S. 294, 355 (1962) (concurring opinion); *id.* at 364-65 (dissenting and concurring opinion); *United States* v. *Borden Co.*, 370 U.S. 460, 477 (1962) (dissenting opinion); *United States* v. *E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.*, 366 U.S. 316, 324 (1961); *International Boxing Club, Inc.* v. *United States*, 358 U.S. 242, 268 (1959) (dissenting opinion).

in 1958 to enlarge the appellate jurisdiction of courts of appeals. In so concluding, the court below relied principally upon two earlier decisions by this Court, neither of which involved consideration of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Although it is settled that, *under the Expediting Act*, interlocutory orders are not reviewable in either the Supreme Court or the courts of appeals, see *Brown Shoe Co.* v. *United States*, 370 U.S. 294, 305 n.9 (1962), that is not the issue presented here. Rather, the question is whether such orders are reviewable by courts of appeals *under the provisions of Section 1292(b)*. This is an issue which has never been decided. The court of appeals failed to comprehend this distinction and concluded that it was without jurisdiction of the appeal because of the Expediting Act. Because of that erroneous belief, the court of appeals failed to exercise the discretion granted to it by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)—whether or not to review the district court's judgment. The decision below thus presents a substantial issue of significant importance warranting review by this Court.

Both the Expediting Act and Section 1292(b) seek a common objective: to secure the speedy disposition of litigation. The Expediting Act, which applies only to Government antitrust cases, seeks that goal by providing for direct appeal to the Supreme Court of final judgments. Section 1292(b), which applies to all civil actions, seeks the same objective by providing for immediate review in the courts of appeals of orders not otherwise appealable that decide close and "controlling" questions if an immediate appeal may hasten the end of the litigation. The statutes are complemen-

tary, and they should be so construed; the restrictions on review imposed by the Expediting Act, enacted at the turn of the century, do not limit the jurisdiction granted to courts of appeals by Section 1292(b), enacted in 1958.

Moreover, it has been held by one court of appeals that notwithstanding the Expediting Act, courts of appeals have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) to review orders granting or denying preliminary injunctions in antitrust cases. *United States* v. *Ingersoll-Rand Co.*, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963). Even though Section 1292(a) contains an exception for cases "where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court," the court of appeals exercised jurisdiction in *Ingersoll-Rand*. Section 1292(b) contains no such exception and is, therefore, a broader grant of jurisdiction.

In any event, Section 1292(b) cannot possibly defeat the speedy disposition of antitrust litigation sought by the Expediting Act. By its terms, the certification statute will not permit an immediate appeal of a certified question except upon a finding that such an appeal may "materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."

Expedition of the present litigation will be served by an interpretation of Section 1292(b) that permits prompt review of the district court's order. Indeed, reversal of that order will terminate the entire litigation.*

---

* The district court action was commenced against Bayer by service under Section 293 of the Patent Code. Thereafter, a "proceeding" being "pending" in the United States District

In enacting Section 1292(b), Congress specifically recognized that early determination of threshold issues —such as jurisdiction—would be useful in securing expeditious determination of long and complex cases.* That purpose will be achieved in cases like this, even though the only appeal from the final judgment may be directly to the Supreme Court.

Section 1292(b) confers upon courts of appeals jurisdiction to hear certified questions in *all* civil actions. It would be ironic to regard the Expediting Act—whose very purpose was to advance the ultimate termination of proceedings—as an obstacle to the employment of this new pathway to the same goal. But that is precisely what the court below did.

Court for the District of Columbia, the Government caused process to be served in Kansas City upon Chemagro under Section 5 of the Sherman Act. If the proceeding against Bayer was not validly commenced, then service under Section 5 of the Sherman Act against Chemagro was not valid, and the action could not be maintained in the District of Columbia. Chemagro, of course, could be sued in Kansas City, where this proceeding really belongs.

* See S. Rep. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) p. 2.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

ALLEN F. MAULSBY
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10005

ARNOLD M. LERMAN
MAX O. TRUITT, JR.
DANIEL K. MAYERS
900 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE
1 Chase Manhatten Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10005

WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING
900 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Sept. 11, 1968

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil No. 586-68

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

v.

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A. G., and CHEMAGRO CORPORATION,
Defendants.

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

1. This is an antitrust case brought by the United States against a German company, Farbenfabriken, and its American subsidiary, Chemagro, pursuant to Section 4 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 4), in order to secure declaratory and injunctive relief. In its complaint, the government asserts that defendants entered into unlawful licensing agreements with over a hundred American firms, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1). According to the complaint, such license agreements prevent competition in the sale of an important insecticide and they place unlawful restraints upon the alienation of the product by purchasers thereof.

2. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Court finds that this action is one "affecting the patent or rights thereunder" within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 293. Moreover, the relief which the government

prays for constitutes "action respecting the patent or rights thereunder" which 35 U.S.C. § 293 gives this Court the same jurisdiction to take that it would have if the patentee were personally within the jurisdiction of the Court.

The motion to dismiss is, therefore, this 10th day of May, 1968, denied.

It is so ordered.

/s/ Edward M. Curran
United States District Judge

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 586-68

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

v.

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A. G., and CHEMAGRO CORPORATION,
Defendants.

AMENDED ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

1. This is an antitrust case brought by the United States against a German company, Farbenfabriken Bayer, A.G., and its American subsidiary, Chemagro Corporation, pursuant to Section 4 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 4), in order to secure declaratory and injunctive relief. In its complaint the government asserts that Bayer owns a patent for diethyl and that the Bayer Patent does not cover or purport to cover the use of diethyl or the manner in which it is packaged or formulated for use or sale. The complaint further alleges that Bayer has granted Chemagro an exclusive license under the patent. The complaint asserts that Chemagro has entered into more than one hundred contracts in which it agrees to sell diethyl to the vendee and to grant the vendee a license under the patent with certain restrictions and limitations relating to the use and resale of the product by

the purchasers thereof. The complaint alleges that said contracts violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1), and that Chemagro and Bayer have continued and will continue said allegedly unlawful contracts in effect unless this Court grants the relief prayed for in the complaint. It alleges that Bayer combined with Chemagro and participated in said violation by granting an exclusive license to Chemagro, by deriving revenue from Chemagro's contracts, and by its control of Chemagro.

2. On the basis of the foregoing allegations, the Court concludes that this action is one affecting the patent or rights thereunder and that this Court has the same jurisdiction to take action respecting the patent or rights thereunder as it would have if the patentee were personally within the jurisdiction of this Court (35 U.S.C. § 293).

It is, therefore, this 14th day of May, 1968,

ORDERED: that the motion to dismiss is denied; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), it is the opinion of the Court that the denial of the motion to dismiss involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation.

/s/ Edward M. Curran
United States District Judge

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

SEPTEMBER TERM, 1967

C. A. 586-68
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia
Circuit
FILED Jun 25 1968
/s/ Nathan J. Paulson
Clerk

No. Misc. 3277

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER, A.S.,
Applicant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

Before: Bazelon, Chief Judge; and Burger and Robinson, Circuit Judges, in Chambers.

ORDER

On consideration of applicant's application for interlocutory appeal, of respondent's opposition thereto and applicant's reply, it is

ORDERED by the Court that applicant's aforesaid application is denied. *Brown Shoe Co.* v. *United States*, 370 U.S. 294, 305 n. 9 (1962); *United States* v. *Cali-*

fornia Cooperative Canneries, 279 U.S. 461 (1929); *National Association of Real Estate Boards* v. *United States*, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 165, 176 F.2d 631 (1949).

Per Curiam.

Circuit Judge Burger did not participate in the foregoing order.

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JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

No. 38 Misc.

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A.G.,
Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION AND PETITION FOR COMMON LAW WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ALLEN F. MAULSBY
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10005

ARNOLD M. LERMAN
MAX O. TRUITT, JR.
DANIEL K. MAYERS
900 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE
1 Chase Manhatten Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10005

WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING
900 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Sept. 11, 1968

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Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

No. 0 Misc.

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A.G.,
Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR COMMON LAW WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Farbenfabriken Bayer A.G. ("Bayer") respectfully moves this Court for leave to file the annexed petition for a common law writ of certiorari pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), directed to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, to review an order of that court entered on May 10, 1968, as amended by a judgment entered on May 14, 1968, both of which denied the motion of Bayer for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that process

and service thereof were insufficient to bring Bayer within the jurisdiction of the Court.

Respectfully submitted,

ALLEN F. MAULSBY
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10005

ARNOLD M. LERMAN
MAX O. TRUITT, JR.
DANIEL K. MAYERS
900 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE
1 Chase Manhatten Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10005

WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING
900 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

No. Misc.

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A.G.,
Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR COMMON LAW WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari be issued to review the order of the district court dated May 10, 1968, as amended by a judgment entered on May 14, 1968, which denied petitioner's motion to dismiss the Sherman Act complaint on the ground that process and service thereof were insufficient to bring petitioner within the jurisdiction of the district court.

OPINION BELOW

The district court did not write an opinion. A copy of the order of May 10, 1968 (R. 18),* is an-

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* References to "R. ——" are to the certified record of the district court, a copy of which has been filed in this Court.

nexed hereto as Appendix A. A copy of the judgment of May 14, 1968 (R. 23), amending that order is annexed hereto as Appendix B.

JURISDICTION TO REVIEW

The date of the judgment of the district court sought to be reviewed is May 14, 1968. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).

Section 2 of the Expediting Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 29, confers upon this Court exclusive appellate jurisdiction of a "final judgment" in civil actions brought by the United States under the Sherman Act. Grant of the common law writ of certiorari is sought here in aid of that jurisdiction. The power and jurisdiction of this Court to review the judgment and order below by common law writ of certiorari are sustained by the decisions of this Court in *United States Alkali Export Ass'n, Inc.* v. *United States*, 325 U.S. 196 (1945); *De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd.* v. *United States*, 325 U.S. 212 (1945).*

The special and unusual circumstances warranting exercise by this Court of its discretionary power to issue the common law writ of certiorari are more fully

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* The propriety of reviewing jurisdictional questions by means of extraordinary writ was even more firmly established when Congress revised the All Writs Act in 1948. At that time the House Report specifically approved the decisions in *Alkali* and *De Beers*. See H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), p. A145.

set forth under "Reasons for Granting the Writ" (pp. 8-20, *infra*).*

QUESTION PRESENTED

Section 293 of the Patent Code authorizes service of process upon a patentee not residing in the United States with respect to "proceedings affecting the patent or rights thereunder . . . ." The question presented by this application is whether that section permits service of process on a non-resident patentee in an antitrust action brought by the United States which challenges neither the validity nor the patentee's use of the patent, and where, on the other hand, the complaint affirmatively states that the conduct complained of is not covered by the patent.

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* The question presented by the order and judgment of the district court is a substantial federal question of first impression. In order, therefore, not to forego any available appellate remedy, Bayer noted an appeal under the Expediting Act from the district court's judgment. To prosecute that appeal, Bayer is filing concurrently herewith a Jurisdictional Statement in which it asserts that the order and judgment of the district court are final for purposes of immediate review by this Court under the Expediting Act.

As an alternative to direct review in this Court, either by appeal or by extraordinary writ, Bayer sought leave to appeal the judgment of the district court in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Although the district court's judgment included the findings requisite to such an appeal (R. 23), the court of appeals denied leave. Therefore, Bayer is also filing concurrently herewith petitions for writs of certiorari pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) seeking review of the court of appeals' order denying leave to appeal.

STATUTE INVOLVED

The statute involved is 35 U.S.C. § 293, which provides as follows:

> "Every patentee not residing in the United States may file in the Patent Office a written designation stating the name and address of a person residing within the United States on whom may be served process or notice of proceedings affecting the patent or rights thereunder. If the person designated cannot be found at the address given in the last designation, or if no person has been designated, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall have jurisdiction and summons shall be served by publication or otherwise as the court directs. The court shall have the same jurisdiction to take any action respecting the patent or rights thereunder that it would have if the patentee were personally within the jurisdiction of the court."

STATEMENT

This suit concerns a novel and unprecedented attempt by the Department of Justice to commence an antitrust action in the District of Columbia against a foreign corporation not found within the jurisdiction by serving process under a little used provision of the Patent Code.

This is a civil antitrust action brought by the United States pursuant to Section 4 of the Sherman Act. There are two named defendants—Bayer and Chemagro. Bayer is a West German corporation (R. 1). It is not found within, it does not transact business

within, and it is not licensed to transact business within the District of Columbia. Chemagro is a New York corporation with its principal place of business in Kansas City, Missouri.* (R. 1, ¶ 4).

Bayer is the owner of United States Patent No. 2,759,010 (the "Bayer patent"). The Bayer patent covers the manufacture of a chemical compound known as diethyl, a highly toxic substance used in the manufacture of certain insecticides. Bayer has granted Chemagro an exclusive license under the Bayer patent to make, use and sell diethyl within the United States (R. 1).

The complaint alleges that Chemagro has entered into contracts under which it agrees to sell diethyl and to grant the puchaser a limited license under the patent to use or resell diethyl only in certain restricted ways. Those agreements between Chemagro and its customers are alleged to violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

The complaint does not allege that Bayer has entered into any such contracts or licensing agreements. Rather, in paragraph 10 it alleges that Bayer has "combined" with Chemagro and "participated" in Chemagro's violation by (1) granting Chemagro an exclusive license, (2) deriving revenue from Chemagro's contracts, and (3) its control of Chemagro. However, by alleging that Bayer has granted Chem-

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* Although Chemagro is a wholly owned subsidiary of Bayer, this fact does not appear germane to the Government's attempt to serve Bayer with process under Section 293.

agro an exclusive license * under the Bayer patent the Government appears to acknowledge that Bayer has no rights in the United States under its patent. Moreover, the complaint avers that the conduct the Government complains of is not within the scope of the patent—indeed, it avers that the patent does not even "purport" to cover that conduct (R. 1, ¶ 7).

Process was served by mail upon Bayer at its offices in Leverkusen, West Germany, purportedly under the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 293, which authorizes service upon foreign patent owners only in proceedings "affecting the patent or rights thereunder." Since the complaint alleged that Bayer's patent neither covered nor purported to cover the allegedly illegal conduct and, in any event, since Bayer had on rights under the patent, Bayer moved to dismiss the complaint as to it on the ground that Section 293 did not authorize the issuance of process against it in this action (R. 14). And, since Bayer was not in any way "present" within the District of Columbia, it urged that the district court had no other basis for asserting *in personam* jurisdiction over it. It is the denial of that motion to dismiss which Bayer brings before this Court.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

In denying petitioner's motion to dismiss, the district court decided a novel and substantial federal

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* It is undisputed that Chemagro has the exclusive right to make, use and sell diethyl in the United States, that Bayer does not make, use or sell diethyl in the United States, and that Chemagro exercises responsibility for the marketing of diethyl in the United States (R. 14, Ex. A).

question of first impression. For the first time since its enactment in 1952, a little used section of the Patent Code, intended to enable process in suits "affecting" United States patents or "rights thereunder" to reach non-resident patent owners, has been used as the sole basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in an action not arising under the patent laws.* Such an interpretation is wholly at odds with Congress' clear intent in enacting a provision for serving process in patent actions. If the decision is permitted to stand, Section 293 will have undergone an instant expansion whereby process can be served on any foreign patentee in any Government antitrust case in which there can be made any colorable allegation that a patent is in any way involved.

If this provision of the Patent Code is now to be used by the Government in antitrust cases to bring foreign defendants not otherwise amenable to process within the district court's jurisdiction, that issue ought to be decided by this Court and not by a single judge in an order unaccompanied by explanation or written opinion.

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* This case is actually one of two antitrust actions of which we are aware that have been commenced by service under Section 293. See *United States* v. *Glaxo Group*, Civil Action No. 558-68, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, *leave to appeal denied*, Misc. No. 3261, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (1968). In *Glaxo*, however, the Government challenged the validity of one of the patents involved and, as part of the relief, sought a declaration of the patent's invalidity. Thus *Glaxo* does not raise the same issues with regard to the application of Section 293 as are present in this case.

Not only is the district court's decision novel and unprecedented, it is also inconsistent with the legislative history of the section, and contrary to the cases heretofore decided under it. Moreover, it constitutes an unwarranted and unauthorized expansion of the antitrust jurisdiction of United States courts over persons not "present" within the United States. Finally, the construction of Section 293 adopted by the district court raises serious constitutional questions.

This case does not arise under any Act of Congress relating to patents; * the complaint does not allege infringement, interference, or any other cause of action under the patent laws.** There is neither any allegation nor any relief sought "affecting the patent." And, the admission in the complaint that the patent does not purport to cover the conduct complained of makes clear that the proceeding does not even affect Bayer's "rights thereunder."

Considerations of both justice and efficiency require that the judgment of the district court, denying Bayer's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, be reviewed at this time.*** Surely Bayer

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* District courts have jurisdiction of such cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).

** 35 U.S.C. §§ 281-93.

*** It is not unusual for this Court to hear, in such circumstances, questions that determine whether persons should be parties to Government antitrust suits before the action has gone its full course to final judgment. For example, this Court took jurisdiction to determine whether a would-be intervenor should be allowed to participate in an antitrust suit before the trial court had completed its action. *Cascade Natu-*

should not be required to produce documents, engage in costly pretrial preparation, and suffer the vicissitudes of protracted litigation if it is correct in its claim that the district court lacks jurisdiction. And it seems equally clear that the efficiency of the judicial process is not enhanced by requiring an already beleaguered district court to go through the time-consuming process of a full-scale antitrust trial when it may well be that the whole proceeding will go for naught because of the court's initial lack of jurisdiction over Bayer.*

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ral Gas Corp. v. *El Paso Natural Gas Co.*, 386 U.S. 129 (1967). See also *Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co.* v. *United States*, 389 U.S. 580 (1968), affirming a district court denial of leave to intervene in a Government antitrust action.

* Because of the presence of Chemagro in this litigation, the use by the Government of Section 293 to serve process on Bayer causes additional distortion of the judicial process. Only the United States District Court for the District of Columbia could issue process in this case against Bayer under Section 293, and, therefore, suit could be brought against Bayer only in that District. Because of the pendency of the action in the district court, the Government was then permitted to service process upon Chemagro in Kansas City under the provisions of Section 5 of the Sherman Act. If Bayer were not a party to the litigation, Chemagro could not be sued in the District of Columbia because it has no connection with this District, and the venue of this action would probably be in Kansas City, Chemagro's principal place of business. Thus, the domestic corporation, which is the exclusive licensee, is forced to defend itself 1,500 miles from its principal place of business; and both it and Bayer are compelled to litigate in a forum which has no conceivable connection with either. Moreover, if Bayer is correct that it was not subject to service of process under Section 293, then Chemagro cannot validly be tried in the District of Columbia and any proceeding here would be useless.

1. Section 293 was enacted in 1952 as part of the general revision and codification of the patent laws. Both its legislative history and the reported decisions interpreting it demonstrate beyond serious question that the section was intended to create a method theretofore unavailable for serving process upon nonresident patentees only in actions arising under the patent laws.

Every aspect of the statute indicates that it was intended to relate only to the patent laws. The section is part of the Patent Code; if it had been intended by Congress to be a general jurisdictional statute, it presumably would have been located in the Judicial Code, Title 28. Moreover, Section 293 is the last section of Chapter 29, a chapter devoted to "*Remedies for Infringement of Patent and Other Actions*," and consisting of Sections 281 through 293. Thus, it seems obvious that the section should be construed in the context of that chapter, all of which relates to actions under the patent laws.

The legislative history reaffirms this obvious construction. The Senate Report on the bill (H.R. 7794, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1952)) opened its discussion of Chapter 29 with the following explanation:

> "Beginning with 281 is a group of sections relating to remedy for infringement of a patent, the suit in the courts." S. Rep. No. 1979, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1952), p. 8. See also H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1952) p. 10.

The report goes on to describe Section 293 as:

> "a new section that is needed on some occasions to obtain jurisdiction over foreign patent owners

that do not reside in the United States." *Id.* at 9. See also H.R. Rep. No. 1923, *supra*, p. 10.

The hearings bear out those statements in the report. The most common causes of action arising under the patent laws brought against patent owners are suits for declaration of non-infringement or invalidity. Such suits without question are within the jurisdiction of district courts since they "arise under" acts of Congress relating to patents. See, *e.g.*, *Edward Katzinger Co.* v. *Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co.*, 329 U.S. 394 (1947); *E. Edelmann & Co.* v. *Triple-A Specialty Co.*, 88 F.2d 852, 854 (7th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 300 U.S. 680 (1937). It was precisely that type of action to which the Executive Branch wished the substituted-service provision of Section 293 to apply. In commenting upon a provision of H.R. 3760 that was identical with the present Section 293, the State Department noted its understanding:

> "that this provision has been added for the benefit of American residents desiring to bring action against foreign owners of United States patents. At the present time American manufacturers threatened by charges of infringement of United States patents by persons resident abroad are especially handicapped by the inability to bring suit for declaratory judgment." Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. on H.R. 3760, p. 91.

The Department of Justice confirmed this view of the statute. *Id.* at 98.

Thus, the legislative history underscores the plain meaning of the language of the section: the section is applicable only to actions under the patent laws—those for declaratory judgments for infringement or invalidity. There is no suggestion anywhere in the history that the section authorizes service upon nonresident patent owners in tax cases, or food and drug act cases, or antitrust cases, or, indeed, any cases merely because the income, product or business involved derives from a patent. It authorizes service only in cases that arise under the patent laws.

2. We have found no reported decision in which Section 293 was used as a basis for service of process except cases under the patent laws.* The judgment of the district court thus rests on an interpretation of Section 293 that is inconsistent not only with the legislative history of the section but with its prior judicial construction. In *North Branch Prod., Inc.* v. *Fisher*, 179 F. Supp. 843 (D.D.C.), *reversed on other grounds*, 109 U.S. App. D.C. 182, 284 F.2d 611 (1960), *cert. denied*, 365 U.S. 827 (1961), the district court below limited the application of the statute to cases "under the patent laws." Plaintiff there was

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* See *Abington Textile Mach. Works* v. *Carding Specialists (Canada), Ltd.*, 249 F. Supp 823, 827 (D.D.C. 1965); *Scandia House Enterprises, Inc.* v. *Dam Things Establishment*, 243 F. Supp. 450, 451 (D.D.C. 1965); *Sealol Corp.* v. *Flexibox Ltd.*, 242 F. Supp. 693, 694 (D.D.C. 1965); *Etablissements Henry-Le Paute* v. *American Greiner Electronics, Inc.*, 172 F. Supp. 228, 229 (D. Conn. 1959); and *Webster-Chicago Corp.* v. *Holstensson*, 132 F. Supp. 287 (D.D.C. 1955). *Cf. Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n* v. *Ronson Corp.*, 257 F. Supp. 219 (D.N.J. 1966).

a Michigan corporation that had sued a non-resident patentee for a declaratory judgment adjudicating that certain patents and patent applications were owned by it and not by the defendant. Such a case, founded in contract and not in patent rights created by Congress, does not "arise under" the patent laws. See *Wade* v. *Lawder*, 165 U.S. 624 (1897). The defendant had been served by publication pursuant to Section 293. It moved to quash such service and to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court, although finding that the defendant had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by asserting a counterclaim, observed that:

> ". . . the phrase 'proceedings affecting the patent or rights thereunder' contained in 35 U.S.C. § 293, should be construed as synonymous with 'actions under the patent laws of the United States' and, therefore, should be limited and restricted to actions for infringement of patents and actions for declaratory judgments to adjudicate the validity or infringement of patents." 179 F. Supp. at 845-46.

Petitioner submits that *North Branch* represents a correct resolution of the question and that the decision below is erroneous.

3. Clearly Section 293 was not intended to subject foreign patent owners to the general personal jurisdiction of United States courts. By its terms, the statute is limited to actions "affecting the patent or rights thereunder." Nonetheless, the position of the Government, adopted by the court below, expands the section's coverage to such an extent that any connection

between a patent and a cause of action—however remote—may be sufficient to bring a foreign patent owner within the jurisdiction of the District Court for the District of Columbia. Such an interpretation not only ignores clear language and plain Congressional purpose, it also raises serious constitutional doubts as to whether such a broad jurisdictional claim squares with that process due litigants under the Fifth Amendment.

The only "act" which connects Bayer in any way with the District of Columbia is its ownership of a United States patent. In this case, the validity of that patent is not challenged; nor is the validity of the exclusive license to Chemagro (representing the "rights thereunder") brought into question by the complaint. Indeed, the complaint itself asserts that the very conduct alleged to violate the antitrust laws is not within the scope of the patent—that such conduct by Chemagro is not an exercise of any right of Bayer "under" the patent. To subject Bayer to the jurisdiction of the court in these circumstances clearly offends those "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" which the Fifth Amendment guarantees to litigants. *International Shoe Co.* v. *Washington*, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

Except in a limited class of cases, the Due Process clause prohibits a court from exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-resident not having "minimal contacts" with the jurisdiction. The exception involves the conditioning of some right on an implied agreement that the person receiving the benefit will be amenable to service in cases arising directly out of

the exercise of the right or the receipt of the benefit. Thus a non-resident motorist will be subject to an in personam action which arises as a result of his use of an automobile on the streets of a foreign jurisdiction.* *See, e.g., Hess* v. *Pawloski*, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).

There is no allegation of the complaint that Bayer is "found" within the District of Columbia, or that it has offices there, employs salesmen, takes orders, transacts business, or otherwise has *any* contact with the District of Columbia.

Thus, the assertion of jurisdiction must be based on the theory that Bayer, by owning a United States patent, has availed itself of certain benefits of United States law and has, in return therefor, impliedly agreed to subject itself to jurisdiction in suits arising from such benefits. But, as this Court has made clear, where the defendant is not found within the jurisdiction the connection between the alleged benefit and the act complained of must be apparent. As was true in *Hanson* v. *Denckla*, 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958), the present "suit cannot be said to be one to enforce an obligation that arose from a privilege that the defendant exercised" within the jurisdiction.**

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* However, the fact that he once drove on the streets will not subject him to the jurisdiction of the courts in unrealted actions, for example, contract actions.

** Professor Moore puts it this way:

> "If there is a minimum of contacts and the cause of action does not arise out of the contacts, there will normally be no basis of jurisdiction, since it is difficult to establish the factors necessary to meet the fair and reasonable test." 2 Moore, Federal Practice, ¶ 4.25[5], p. 1173.

The unwarranted jurisdictional expansion accomplished by the court below in effect makes foreign patent holders—doing no business in the United States —subject to suit for all sorts of actions not challenging the validity of their patents or their rights thereunder. It seems highly unlikely that Congress, in enacting a simple service of process section for suits arising under the patent laws, intended such far-reaching results which push at the very limits of due process. Rather, the constitutional obstacles to such a broad assertion of jurisdiction reinforce the obvious and plain construction of the statute: that the phrase "affecting the patent or rights thereunder" was intended by Congress to define those actions arising under the patent laws, of which Section 293 is itself a part.

4. In ascertaining the meaning and scope of Section 293, the Court must, of course, reject any construction that reaches an unconstitutional result. The interpretation of the court below, however, raises a second issue of constitutional dimension that was recognized by the district court in *North Branch*.

It is clear that not all actions which may affect patents or rights thereunder are within the judicial power conferred by Article III of the Constitution upon the federal courts. For example, a controversy over a contract assigning a patent does not "arise under" federal law and, absent some independent basis of federal jurisdiction, such as diversity, cannot be maintained in a federal court. *See, e.g., Wade* v. *Lawder*, 165 U.S. 624 (1897).

In enacting Section 293 Congress surely intended to stay within the boundaries of Article III. Therefore, it must have intended the words "affecting the patent or rights thereunder" to mean "arising under the patent laws." That was the conclusion reached in *North Branch*. Any contrary construction would, in some cases, purport to confer subject matter jurisdiction beyond that authorized by Article III and would be plainly invalid.

That construction, of course, must prevail even in a case where, like this one, there is an independent ground of subject matter jurisdiction. The mere happenstance that federal jurisdiction exists in this case by virtue of the Sherman Act * is irrelevant in interpreting the scope that Congress intended for Section 293. Congress plainly did not enact Section 293 as an ancillary provision to the antitrust laws; rather, it intended it as an aid to enforcement of patent rights. Since any interpretation of "affecting the patent or rights thereunder" broader than "arising under the patent laws" would raise obvious Constitutional is-

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* Of course, if Bayer were in some way "present" or "found" within the District of Columbia, the Clayton Act itself would provide a basis for serving process and asserting personal jurisdiction over Bayer. Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22, provides that venue of an action brought under Section 4 of the Sherman Act may be laid wherever the defendant corporation is "found or transacts business," and that process may be served wherever such a defendant is "found". Section 12 permits foreign corporations, such as Bayer, to be brought personally before United States courts if and only if they have sufficient contacts within the United States to be "present" or "found" within a district. See, *e.g.*, *United States* v. *Scophony Corp.*, 333 U.S. 795 (1948).

sues in cases where no independent basis of federal jurisdiction exists, this strict interpretation of the language must control in gauging Congress' intent. And since it is beyond dispute that this case does not "arise under" the patent laws, the use of the substituted service provided for in Section 293 was invalid.

CONCLUSION

This case involves a substantial federal question of first impression raising serious constitutional questions and important and substantial issues of statutory construction. For the reasons stated, this Court should grant the petition.

Respectfully submitted,

ALLEN F. MAULSBY
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10005

ARNOLD M. LERMAN
MAX O. TRUITT, JR.
DANIEL K. MAYERS
900 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE
1 Chase Manhatten Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10005

WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING
900 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Sept. 11, 1968

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil No. 586-68

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

v.

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A. G., and CHEMAGRO CORPORATION,
Defendants.

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

1. This is an antitrust case brought by the United States against a German company, Farbenfabriken, and its American subsidiary, Chemagro, pursuant to Section 4 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 4), in order to secure declaratory and injunctive relief. In its complaint, the government asserts that defendants entered into unlawful licensing agreements with over a hundred American firms, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1). According to the complaint, such license agreements prevent competition in the sale of an important insecticide and they place unlawful restraints upon the alienation of the product by purchasers thereof.

2. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Court finds that this action is one "affecting the patent or rights thereunder" within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 293. Moreover, the relief which the government

prays for constitutes "action respecting the patent or rights thereunder" which 35 U.S.C. § 293 gives this Court the same jurisdiction to take that it would have if the patentee were personally within the jurisdiction of the Court.

The motion to dismiss is, therefore, this 10th day of May, 1968, denied.

It is so ordered.

/s/ Edward M. Curran
United States District Judge

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 586-68

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

v.

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A. G., and CHEMAGRO CORPORATION,
Defendants.

AMENDED ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

1. This is an antitrust case brought by the United States against a German company, Farbenfabriken Bayer, A.G., and its American subsidiary, Chemagro Corporation, pursuant to Section 4 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 4), in order to secure declaratory and injunctive relief. In its complaint the government asserts that Bayer owns a patent for diethyl and that the Bayer Patent does not cover or purport to cover the use of diethyl or the manner in which it is packaged or formulated for use or sale. The complaint further alleges that Bayer has granted Chemagro an exclusive license under the patent. The complaint asserts that Chemagro has entered into more than one hundred contracts in which it agrees to sell diethyl to the vendee and to grant the vendee a license under the patent with certain restrictions and limitations relating to the use and resale of the product by

the purchasers thereof. The complaint alleges that said contracts violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1), and that Chemagro and Bayer have continued and will continue said allegedly unlawful contracts in effect unless this Court grants the relief prayed for in the complaint. It alleges that Bayer combined with Chemagro and participated in said violation by granting an exclusive license to Chemagro, by deriving revenue from Chemagro's contracts, and by its control of Chemagro.

2. On the basis of the foregoing allegations, the Court concludes that this action is one affecting the patent or rights thereunder and that this Court has the same jurisdiction to take action respecting the patent or rights thereunder as it would have if the patentee were personally within the jurisdiction of this Court (35 U.S.C. § 293).

It is, therefore, this 14th day of May, 1968,

ORDERED: that the motion to dismiss is denied; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), it is the opinion of the Court that the denial of the motion to dismiss involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation.

/s/ Edward M. Curran
United States District Judge

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Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

No. 839 Misc.

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A.G.,
Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION AND PETITION FOR COMMON LAW WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

ALLEN F. MAULSBY
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10005

ARNOLD M. LERMAN
MAX O. TRUITT, JR.
DANIEL K. MAYERS
900 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE
1 Chase Manhatten Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10005

WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING
900 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Sept. 11, 1968

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Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

No. Misc.

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A.G.,
Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR COMMON LAW WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Farbenfabriken Bayer A.G. ("Bayer") respectfully moves this Court for leave to file the annexed petition for common law writ of certiorari pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), directed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, to review an order of that court entered on

June 25, 1968, which denied petitioner leave to appeal.

Respectfully submitted,

ALLEN F. MAULSBY
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10005

ARNOLD M. LERMAN
MAX O. TRUITT, JR.
DANIEL K. MAYERS
900 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE
1 Chase Manhatten Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10005

WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING
900 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

No. Misc.

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A.G.,
Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR COMMON LAW WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari be issued to review the order of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dated June 25, 1968, which denied petitioner's Application for Leave to Appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia entered on May 10, 1968, is annexed hereto as Appendix A. A copy of the judg-

ment of that court entered on May 14, 1968 (R. 1, App. A)* amending such order, is annexed hereto as Appendix B. The judgment of the court below, denying petitioner leave to appeal, is not reported and is attached as Appendix C (R. 4).

JURISDICTION TO REVIEW

The order of the court of appeals denying petitioner leave to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) was entered on June 25, 1968 (R. 4). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). The power and jurisdiction of this Court to review the order of the court of appeals is established by its decision in *In Re 620 Church St. Bldg. Corp.*, 299 U.S. 24 (1936).**

QUESTION PRESENTED

The question presented is whether the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29, precludes a court of appeals from entertaining an interlocutory appeal properly certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), especially where an immediate appeal would serve the purpose of the Expediting Act by permitting prompt decision on a jurisdictional issue that might terminate the litigation without the time and expense of trial.

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* References to "R. ——" are to the certified record of the court of appeals, a copy of which has been filed in this Court.

** By a petition filed concurrently herewith, petitioner is also seeking review of the order of the court of appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). Beginning with the "Statement," the text of both documents is identical.

STATUTES INVOLVED

The statutory provisions are:

(1) Section 2 of the Expediting Act, 69 Stat. 989 (1948), 15 U.S.C. § 29, which provides:

"In every civil action brought in any district court of the United States under any of said Acts, wherein the United States is complainant, an appeal from the final judgment of the district court will lie only to the Supreme Court."

(2) 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which provides:

"(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: *Provided, however,* That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order."

STATEMENT *

This is a civil antitrust action brought by the United States pursuant to Section 4 of the Sherman Act in the District of Columbia. There are two named defendants—Bayer and Chemagro Corporation (R. 1, pp. 2-3).

Process was served by mail upon Bayer at its offices in Leverkusen, West Germany, purportedly under the authority of 35 U.S.C. § 293, a provision of the Patent Code. Bayer moved to dismiss the complaint as to it on the ground that Section 293 did not authorize the issuance of process against it in this action. And, since Bayer was not in any way "present" within the District of Columbia, it urged that the district court had no other basis for asserting *in personam* jurisdiction over it.

By order entered on May 10, 1968, the district court denied Bayer's motion. On May 14, 1968, at Bayer's request, the district court amended that order by entering a judgment including findings appropriate to permit Bayer to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b).

On May 24, 1968, Bayer timely filed in the court of appeals an application for leave to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (R. 1). Bayer's purpose was

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* Petitioner believes the following abbreviated statement of facts is sufficient for this petition. A more extended statement of facts is set forth in the Jurisdictional Statement and in the Petition for Writ of Common Law Certiorari, filed concurrently herewith, which seek review of the merits of the district court's order.

to get immediate appellate review of an issue which could terminate an otherwise long, costly and burdensome litigation. On June 25, 1968, the court of appeals, by *per curiam* order, denied leave to appeal (R. 4). It is apparent that the court of appeals did not exercise the discretion granted to it by Section 1292 (b). The sole ground for denial of leave was the court of appeals' view that the Expediting Act deprived it of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.*

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This petition raises a significant federal issue of first impression. It is an issue that will have considerable impact both on the conduct of Government antitrust litigation and the allocation of jurisdiction between this Court and the courts of appeals in antitrust cases. Even though this Court has many times noted the burden that the Expediting Act places upon its jurisdiction,** it has never considered whether the

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* The only cases cited in support of the denial of leave to appeal are *Brown Shoe Co.* v. *United States*, 370 U.S. 294, 305 n.9 (1962); *United States* v. *California Cooperative Canneries*, 279 U.S. 553 (1929); and *National Association of Real Estate Boards* v. *United States*, 85 U.S. App. D.C. 165, 176 F.2d 631 (1949). Moreover, the only argument advanced by the Government in opposition to the application for leave to appeal was that the Expediting Act precluded court of appeals' review even of the threshold jurisdictional question.

** *United States* v. *Grinnell Corp.*, 384 U.S. 563, 585 (1966) (dissenting opinion); *United States* v. *Singer Mfg. Co.*, 374 U.S. 174, 175 n.1 (1963); *id.* at 202 (dissenting opinion); *Brown Shoe Co.* v. *United States*, 370 U.S. 294, 355 (1962) (concurring opinion); *id.* at 364-65 (dissenting and concurring

enactment in 1958 of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), giving the courts of appeals jurisdiction to entertain interlocutory appeals, creates a machinery for expediting the conduct of antitrust cases in conformity with the policies of the Expediting Act.

The court of appeals in this case apparently concluded that the Expediting Act, enacted at the turn of the century, overrode the clear intent of Congress in 1958 to enlarge the appellate jurisdiction of courts of appeals. In so concluding, the court below relied principally upon two earlier decisions by this Court, neither of which involved consideration of 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b). Although it is settled that, *under the Expediting Act*, interlocutory orders are not reviewable in either the Supreme Court or the courts of appeals, see *Brown Shoe Co.* v. *United States*, 370 U.S. 294, 305 n.9 (1962), that is not the issue presented here. Rather, the question is whether such orders are reviewable by courts of appeals *under the provisions of Section 1292 (b)*. This is an issue which has never been decided. The court of appeals failed to comprehend this distinction and concluded that it was without jurisdiction of the appeal because of the Expediting Act. Because of that erroneous belief, the court of appeals failed to exercise the discretion granted to it by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)—whether or not to review the dis-

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opinion); *United States* v. *Borden Co.*, 370 U.S. 460, 477 (1962) (dissenting opinion); *United States* v. *E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.*, 366 U.S. 316, 324 (1961); *International Boxing Club, Inc.* v. *United States*, 358 U.S. 242, 268 (1959) (dissenting opinion).

trict court's judgment. The decision below thus presents a substantial issue of significant importance warranting review by this Court.

Both the Expediting Act and Section 1292(b) seek a common objective: to secure the speedy disposition of litigation. The Expediting Act, which applies only to Government antitrust cases, seeks that goal by providing for direct appeal to the Supreme Court of final judgments. Section 1292(b), which applies to all civil actions, seeks the same objective by providing for immediate review in the courts of appeals of orders not otherwise appealable that decide close and "controlling" questions if an immediate appeal may hasten the end of the litigation. The statutes are complementary and they should be so construed; the restrictions on review imposed by the Expediting Act, enacted at the turn of the century, do not limit the jurisdiction granted to courts of appeals by Section 1292(b), enacted in 1958.

Moreover, it has been held by one court of appeals that notwithstanding the Expediting Act, courts of appeals have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) to review orders granting or denying preliminary injunctions in antitrust cases. *United States* v. *Ingersoll-Rand Co.*, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963). Even though Section 1292(a)(1) contains an exception for cases "where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court," the court of appeals exercised jurisdiction in *Ingersoll-Rand*. Section 1292(b) contains no such exception and is, therefore, a broader grant of jurisdiction.

In any event, Section 1292(b) cannot possibly defeat the speedy disposition of antitrust litigation sought by the Expediting Act. By its terms, the certification statute will not permit an immediate appeal of a certified question except upon a finding that such an appeal may "materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."

Expedition of the present litigation will be served by an interpretation of Section 1292(b) that permits prompt review of the district court's order. Indeed, reversal of that order will terminate the entire litigation.*

In enacting Section 1292(b), Congress specifically recognized that early determination of threshold issues —such as jurisdiction—would be useful in securing expeditious determination of long and complex cases.** That purpose will be achieved in cases like this, even though the only appeal from the final judgment may be directly to the Supreme Court.

Section 1292(b) confers upon courts of appeals jurisdiction to hear certified questions in *all* civil ac-

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* The district court action was commenced against Bayer by service under Section 293 of the Patent Code. Thereafter, a "proceeding" being "pending" in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the Government caused process to be served in Kansas City upon Chemagro under Section 5 of the Sherman Act. If the proceeding against Bayer was not validly commenced, then service under Section 5 of the Sherman Act against Chemagro was not valid, and the action could not be maintained in the District of Columbia. Chemagro, of course, could be sued in Kansas City, where this proceeding really belongs.

** See S. Rep. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) p. 2.

tions. It would be ironic to regard the Expediting Act—whose very purpose was to advance the ultimate termination of proceedings—as an obstacle to the employment of this new pathway to the same goal. But that is precisely what the court below did.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the petition should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

ALLEN F. MAULSBY
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10005

ARNOLD M. LERMAN
MAX O. TRUITT, JR.
DANIEL K. MAYERS
900 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Attorneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE
1 Chase Manhatten Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10005

WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING
900 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Sept. 11, 1968

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil No. 586-68

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

v.

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A. G., and CHEMAGRO CORPORATION,
Defendants.

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

1. This is an antitrust case brought by the United States against a German company, Farbenfabriken, and its American subsidiary, Chemagro, pursuant to Section 4 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 4), in order to secure declaratory and injunctive relief. In its complaint, the government asserts that defendants entered into unlawful licensing agreements with over a hundred American firms, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1). According to the complaint, such license agreements prevent competition in the sale of an important insecticide and they place unlawful restraints upon the alienation of the product by purchasers thereof.

2. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Court finds that this action is one "affecting the patent or rights thereunder" within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 293. Moreover, the relief which the government

prays for constitutes "action respecting the patent or rights thereunder" which 35 U.S.C. § 293 gives this Court the same jurisdiction to take that it would have if the patentee were personally within the jurisdiction of the Court.

The motion to dismiss is, therefore, this 10th day of May, 1968, denied.

It is so ordered.

/s/ Edward M. Curran
United States District Judge

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APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 586-68

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

v.

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A. G., and CHEMAGRO CORPORATION,
Defendants.

AMENDED ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

1. This is an antitrust case brought by the United States against a German company, Farbenfabriken Bayer, A.G., and its American subsidiary, Chemagro Corporation, pursuant to Section 4 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 4), in order to secure declaratory and injunctive relief. In its complaint the government asserts that Bayer owns a patent for diethyl and that the Bayer Patent does not cover or purport to cover the use of diethyl or the manner in which it is packaged or formulated for use or sale. The complaint further alleges that Bayer has granted Chemagro an exclusive license under the patent. The complaint asserts that Chemagro has entered into more than one hundred contracts in which it agrees to sell diethyl to the vendee and to grant the vendee a license under the patent with certain restrictions and limitations relating to the use and resale of the product by

the purchasers thereof. The complaint alleges that said contracts violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1), and that Chemagro and Bayer have continued and will continue said allegedly unlawful contracts in effect unless this Court grants the relief prayed for in the complaint. It alleges that Bayer combined with Chemagro and participated in said violation by granting an exclusive license to Chemagro, by deriving revenue from Chemagro's contracts, and by its control of Chemagro.

2. On the basis of the foregoing allegations, the Court concludes that this action is one affecting the patent or rights thereunder and that this Court has the same jurisdiction to take action respecting the patent or rights thereunder as it would have if the patentee were personally within the jurisdiction of this Court (35 U.S.C. § 293).

It is, therefore, this 14th day of May, 1968,

ORDERED: that the motion to dismiss is denied; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), it is the opinion of the Court that the denial of the motion to dismiss involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation.

/s/ Edward M. Curran
United States District Judge

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

SEPTEMBER TERM, 1967

C. A. 586-68
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia
Circuit
FILED Jun 25 1968
/s/ Nathan J. Paulson
Clerk

No. Misc. 3277

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER, A.S.,
Applicant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

Before: Bazelon, Chief Judge; and Burger and Robinson, Circuit Judges, in Chambers.

ORDER

On consideration of applicant's application for interlocutory appeal, of respondent's opposition thereto and applicant's reply, it is

ORDERED by the Court that applicant's aforesaid application is denied. *Brown Shoe Co.* v. *United States*, 370 U.S. 294, 305 n. 9 (1962); *United States* v. *Cali-*

fornia Cooperative Canneries, 279 U.S. 461 (1929); *National Association of Real Estate Boards* v. *United States*, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 165, 176 F.2d 631 (1949).

Per Curiam.

Circuit Judge Burger did not participate in the foregoing order.

SUPREME COURT, U. S.

OCT 25 1968

Nos. 504, 505, 838 Misc. and 839 Misc.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A.G., APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A.G., PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A.G., PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A.G., PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON VARIOUS MOTIONS AND PETITIONS TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION AND MOTION TO DISMISS IN NO. 504

ERWIN N. GRISWOLD,
Solicitor General,
Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C. 20530.

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In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

No. 504

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A.G., APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 505

FARBENFABRIKEN A.G., PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 838 Misc.

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A.G., PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 839 Misc.

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A.G., PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON VARIOUS MOTIONS AND PETITIONS TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION AND MOTION TO DISMISS IN NO. 504

These are four related cases in which, by various methods, review is sought of the district court's order

denying a motion to dismiss a civil antitrust suit against a foreign corporation, and of the court of appeals' order denying leave for an interlocutory appeal therefrom.

Petitioner-appellant Farbenfabriken Bayer A.G. ("Bayer") is a West German corporation which holds a United States patent (the "Bayer patent") on a chemical compound called diethyl, used in the manufacture of certain agricultural products, such as insecticides (Pet. in No. 838 Misc., pp. 6–7). Bayer's wholly-owned subsidiary, Chemagro Corporation ("Chemagro"), a New York corporation, holds an exclusive license under the Bayer patent to make, use and sell diethyl in the United States (*ibid.*)[1] Chemagro manufactures diethyl at its plant in Kansas City, Missouri (Complaint, para. 9),[2] and is alleged to have entered into more than 100 contracts with American firms under which it sells diethyl to them and licenses them to use it (Complaint, para. 10–11). It is alleged that these sublicense agreements limit the purchaser from reselling diethyl except after further processing and permit the purchaser to sell the finished product only for restricted purposes and to restricted classes of customers (Complaint, para. 11–18).

On March 7, 1968, the United States filed a civil antitrust suit against Bayer and Chemagro in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The complaint charged that the limitations

[1] All of the voting stock of Chemagro is owned by Bayer Foreign Investments, Ltd., a wholly-owned Canadian subsidiary of Bayer. Complaint, para. 4.

[2] The complaint is set out as an appendix to this memorandum, *infra*, pp. 11–18.

imposed upon purchasers' use and sale of diethyl constituted unreasonable restraints of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and that Bayer had combined with Chemagro and had participated in the violation. The complaint requested, *inter alia*, that the defendants be enjoined "from maintaining * * * any restriction on the use to which diethyl purchased from defendants, or from any licensee under the Bayer patent, may be put, and to whom, for what purpose, or where diethyl-containing products may be sold or used" (*infra*, pp. 17–18).

Bayer was served pursuant to Section 293 of the Patent Code, 35 U.S.C. 293. That provision authorizes non-resident patentees to designate a resident agent for receipt of process in "proceedings affecting the patent or rights thereunder," and provides that, in the absence of such a designation, "the United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall have jurisdiction and summons shall be served by publication or otherwise as the court directs." Bayer had designated no agent to receive process with respect to its diethyl patent (Complaint, para. 2) and accordingly was served by certified mail at its offices in West Germany (Pet. in No. 838 Misc., p. 8). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i). Chemagro was then served pursuant to Section 5 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 5.[3]

The defendants moved to dismiss the action as to Bayer on the ground that the service effected under

[3] That section empowers the court before which any proceeding under the Sherman Act may be pending to summon other parties "whether they reside in the district in which the court is held or not."

Section 293 was invalid. The district court denied the motion, holding that "this action is one 'affecting the patent or rights thereunder' within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 293" (Pet. in No. 838 Misc., p. A1). At defendants' request, the district court entered an amended order stating "that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), it is the opinion of the Court that the denial of the motion to dismiss involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation" (Pet. in No. 838 Misc., p. A4). Bayer then applied to the court of appeals under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) for leave to appeal from the district court's order denying the motion to dismiss. The court of appeals denied the application (Pet. in No. 505, pp. A5–A6).

Bayer seeks review in this Court of the orders of both the district court and the court of appeals. No. 504 is a direct appeal from the district court under Section 2 of the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. 29. No. 505 seeks review of the judgment of the court of appeals by writ of certiorari under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). And in Nos. 838 Misc. and 839 Misc., Bayer requests this Court to review the orders below by common law writ of certiorari under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a).

1. In civil antitrust suits brought by the United States, the Expediting Act permits a direct appeal to this Court only from "the final judgment of the district court" (15 U.S.C. 29). The order of the district court denying Bayer's motion to dismiss is plainly not

a "final judgment" within the meaning of the Act. It did not dispose of any aspect of the merits of the government's complaint; it did not determine whether defendants had violated the Sherman Act or pass upon any prayer for relief. Compare *Brown Shoe Co.* v. *United States,* 370 U.S. 294, 308, with *National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards* v. *United States,* 176 F. 2d 631 (C.A.D.C.). The order did no more than permit the action to proceed with Bayer as a defendant and was thus interlocutory, not final. Accordingly, this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal in No. 504.

2. This Court has consistently held that the Expediting Act precludes appeal to the courts of appeals from interlocutory orders in government antitrust cases. *United States* v. *California Cooperative Canneries,* 279 U.S. 553, 558; see *Brown Shoe Co., supra,* 370 U.S. at 305, n. 9. Relying upon these decisions, the court of appeals declined to entertain Bayer's interlocutory appeal from the district court's order. Bayer contends that this established rule of practice was changed by 28 U.S.C. 1292(b), which authorizes the courts of appeals in their discretion to permit appeals from interlocutory orders certified by the district court for that purpose. That provision was enacted, however, in 1958—several years prior to this Court's reiteration in *Brown Shoe Co., supra,* that interlocutory appeals to the courts of appeals are precluded in government antitrust cases.[4]

Moreover, the legislative history of Section 1292(b) shows that it was intended to apply to cases in which

[4] Section 1292 was cited in the *Brown Shoe* opinion (370 U.S. at 306, n. 12).

any appeal from the final judgment would be to the courts of appeals, and not to government civil antitrust cases, in which the final judgments are appealable only to this Court. In furnishing an illustration of the contemplated applicability of Section 1292(b) in antitrust cases, the Senate Report on the bill stated (S. Rep. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3):

> * * * [I]n an antitrust action a plea may be entered that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. If this motion is denied, under existing law the matter is not appealable and the case then goes forward to trial. Disposition of antitrust cases may take considerable time, yet upon appeal following final disposition of such cases, the court of appeals may well determine that the statute of limitations had run and for that reason the district court did not have jurisdiction.

Congress was there obviously referring to private antitrust suits, since appeals "following final disposition" of government antitrust suits are not taken to "the court of appeals" but directly to this Court. Nothing in the legislative history of Section 1292(b) suggests that it was designed to amend the Expediting Act by authorizing appeals from interlocutory orders in civil antitrust suits brought by the government.

The court of appeals correctly declined to entertain Bayer's interlocutory appeal from the district court's order.

3. This Court and the lower federal courts are empowered by 28 U.S.C. 1651(a) to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of

law." The issuance by this Court of a common law writ of certiorari under Section 1651(a) "is not a matter of right but of sound discretion sparingly exercised." Rule 30 of the Rules of this Court. This Court has granted review under Section 1651(a) of interlocutory orders in government antitrust cases only where it believed that compelling circumstances warranted such action, *e.g.*, to determine whether a judicial proceeding conflicted with the jurisdiction conferred by Congress upon a regulatory agency, *U.S. Alkali Export Assn.* v. *United States,* 325 U.S. 196; *Far East Conference* v. *United States,* 342 U.S. 570, or whether the district court had no power to issue an unusual preliminary order which would cause injury that could not subsequently be redressed, *De Beers Mines* v. *United States,* 325 U.S. 212. Such considerations do not obtain here (see *U.S. Alkali Export Assn., supra,* at 202–203).

Moreover, the decision of the district court is correct.

a. Section 293 was first enacted in 1952 as part of a general revision and codification of the patent laws. It provides a means for service of process upon nonresident patentees in "proceedings affecting the patent or rights thereunder." It is petitioner's contention that the section may not be invoked to effect service of process in antitrust suits charging unlawful business practices in exploitation of the patent, but "is applicable only to actions under the patent laws—those for declaratory judgments for infringement or invalidity" (Pet. in No. 838 Misc., p. 14).

It may be true, as petitioner urges (*id.* at 13), that

a principal purpose of Section 293 was to enable American residents to sue non-resident patentees for declarations of non-infringement or invalidity. But that provision is not limited to such actions; it applies broadly to "proceedings affecting the patent or rights thereunder." When Congress in the 1952 codification of the patent laws wished to refer to actions arising under those laws, it did so specifically. For example, 35 U.S.C. 282 enumerates the defenses available "in any action involving the validity or infringement of a patent"; 35 U.S.C. 290 requires that notice be given to the Commissioner of Patents of the filing of any "action under this title." No such limitations were imposed by Congress upon the use of Section 293.[5]

b. The present action is well described by the language of Section 293 as a "proceeding affecting the patent or rights thereunder." Bayer's patent on

[5] The suggestion of the district court in *North Branch Products, Inc.* v. *Fisher*, 179 F. Supp. 843 (D.D.C.), reversed on other grounds, 284 F. 2d 611 (C.A.D.C.), certiorari denied, 365 U.S. 827, that Section 293 "should be construed as being limited to actions under the patent laws" (179 F. Supp. at 845) deserves little weight. The statement was dictum, since the court determined that the defendant had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by asking for affirmative relief on a counterclaim. Moreover, while the court observed that the section is found in the patent laws, it took no note of the specific terminology used by Congress in other provisions thereof, nor did it otherwise indicate that there had been a congressional intent to confine Section 293 to patent cases. Finally, the court's view was prompted by concern that, unless so limited, the section might be invoked in cases over which the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction; no such problem is presented here, since the district court's jurisdiction in cases arising under the antitrust laws is plain.

diethyl constitutes a "grant * * * of the right to exclude others from making, using or selling the invention throughout the United States," 35 U.S.C. 154; the patent has "the attributes of personal property," and the patentee "may * * * convey an exclusive right under his * * * patents" to others, 35 U.S.C. 261. While this suit does not challenge the Bayer patent or Bayer's license to Chemagro, it does attack the terms upon which the rights derived from the patent were exercised. If the sub-licenses challenged here had been issued by Bayer itself, it would be manifest that Section 293 applies. The fact that Bayer's subsidiary, Chemagro, was the contracting party should make no difference, because Section 293 turns on the nature and effect of the proceeding rather than on the identity of parties to the license agreement.

The outer limits of the scope of Section 293 need not be considered here, *e.g.*, whether the section may be invoked to assess a tax liability "merely because the income * * * involved derives from a patent" (Pet. in No. 838 Misc., p. 14). In this case, the nexus between "the patent or rights thereunder" and the antitrust violation charged in the complaint is clear and direct. Section 293 was thus properly invoked here.

c. The constitutional problems alluded to by petitioner are insubstantial. Bayer applied for and received a valuable United States patent from the Patent Office.[6] Through its subsidiary, it has exer-

[6] Section 293 was adopted in 1952. Application for the Bayer patent (U.S. Patent No. 2,759,010) was made on July 28, 1953, and the patent was issued on August 14, 1956.

cised in the United States the monopoly rights conferred by that patent, and both corporations are alleged to have abused such patent rights by using the patent as a means of unlawfully restraining trade in the United States. There is no constitutional barrier to jurisdiction over Bayer in the United States. *International Shoe Co.* v. *Washington*, 326 U.S. 310.

Finally, Bayer suggests that to permit Section 293 to be utilized other than in patent cases, where federal court subject matter jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution is clear, might raise problems under Article III "in cases where no independent basis of federal jurisdiction exists" (Pet. in No. 838 Misc., p. 20). However, Bayer concedes that "federal jurisdiction exists in this case by virtue of the Sherman Act" (*id.* at 19). Hence, the Article III problem alluded to by petitioner is not presented. There is no warrant for affording Section 293 less than its full scope here merely because it may not be applicable in other circumstances.

For the reasons stated, it is respectfully submitted that the appeal in No. 504 should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction and that certiorari should be denied in Nos. 505, 838 Misc. and 839 Misc.

ERWIN N. GRISWOLD,
Solicitor General.

OCTOBER 1968.

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

(Civil No. 586–68. Filed: March 7, 1968)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530, PLAINTIFF

v.

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER, A.G., DIREKTIONS ABTEILUNG, 22 c LEVERKUSEN BAYERWERK, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

CHEMAGRO CORPORATION, HAWTHORN ROAD, KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI 64120, DEFENDANTS

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

The United States of America, plaintiff, brings this civil action against the defendants named in this complaint, and alleges:

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This complaint is filed and this action is instituted under Section 4 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 4), in order to prevent and restrain continuing violations by the defendants of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1).

2. Farbenfabriken Bayer, A.G., a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany (hereafter referred to as "Bayer"), with its principal place of business at Leverkusen, West Germany, is the owner of U.S. Pat. No. 2,579,010 (hereafter referred to as "the Bayer patent"), which is involved in this proceeding. Bayer

has not designated in the Patent Office a person residing within the United States, on whom may be served process or notice of proceedings affecting such patent or rights thereunder. Pursuant to Section 293 of the Patent Code (35 U.S.C. § 293), this Court has jurisdiction to take any action respecting such patent or rights thereunder that it would have if the patentee were personally within the jurisdiction of the Court.

II. THE DEFENDANTS

3. Bayer is named a defendant.

4. Chemagro Corporation (hereafter referred to as "Chemagro"), a corporation oganized and existing under the laws of the State of New York, with its principal place of business at Kansas City, Missouri, is named a defendant. All of the voting stock in Chemagro is owned by Bayer Foreign Investments, Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bayer, and a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Dominion of Canada, with its principal office at Toronto, Canada.

III. DEFINITIONS

5. As used in this complaint, the term "diethyl" means the chemical compound O, O diethyl S–2 (ethylthio) ethyl phosphorodithioate, also known as "Di-Syston", a trademark used by Chemagro.

IV. NATURE OF TRADE AND COMMERCE

6. When diethyl is spread upon the soil near a plant, it is absorbed into the plant's system rendering its sap poisonous. Thus, diethyl kills fauna which bite or suck the treated plant, but it does not harm fauna which do not attack the plant. Because of the foregoing properties, diethyl is a valuable insecticidal product, the utilization of which is rapidly growing.

7. Bayer has granted Chemagro an exclusive license under the Bayer patent, which covers the product diethyl. The Bayer patent does not cover, or purport to cover, the use of diethyl or the manner in which it is packaged or formulated for use or sale.

8. Diethyl is manufactured in the United States only by Chemagro. Chemagro sells diethyl to firms which mix it with fertilizers, pesticides, and other products, or otherwise repackage and resell it, for use by farmers, growers, home gardeners, and others.

9. Chemagro manufactures diethyl at its plant at Kansas City, Missouri, and ships it to customers widely located throughout the United States. In 1966, Chemagro's sales in commerce of diethyl were approximately $3 million.

V. VIOLATIONS CHARGED

10. Beginning in or about 1964 and continuing thereafter up to and including the date of filing of this complaint, Chemagro has entered into and maintained more than 100 contracts with purchasers of diethyl, in unreasonable restraint of the aforesaid trade and commerce, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Bayer combined with Chemagro and participated in said violation by granting an exclusive license on diethyl under the Bayer patent to its subsidiary, Chemagro, by deriving revenue from said contracts, through its subsidiary Chemagro; and by its control of Chemagro. Chemagro and Bayer have continued and will continue said unlawful contracts in effect, unless this Court grants the relief prayed for in this complaint.

11. The aforesaid contracts, described more fully below, each provide that Chemagro agrees to sell diethyl to the purchaser and to license the purchaser to use it, and that the purchaser agrees not to resell

diethyl except as further processed or formulated into particular products or mixtures, to be resold only for restricted purposes and to restricted classes of customer. Many of said contracts further require the purchaser to limit the territory in which diethyl-containing products will be sold, to the United States, and many agreements require the purchaser to place a label on each package of diethyl-containing products, purporting to restrain the use and resale of such products by subsequent purchasers.

12. Chemagro has entered into approximately 46 contracts in which it agrees to sell diethyl to the other party to the contract and to grant it a license under the Bayer patent with the following restrictions and limitations:

(a) The purchaser is to use diethyl only to formulate dry fertilizer particles impregnated with diethyl to a concentration not exceeding 2%;

(b) The purchaser is not to use the diethyl sold it for any other purpose, nor is it to sell diethyl, as such, to any other person;

(c) The purchaser is to sell the diethyl-impregnated fertilizer only for use by commercial growers, and is not to sell it for home and garden use;

(d) The purchaser is to place on the packages of diethyl-containing products which it sells, a label purporting to restrain the use of said products by the purchasers thereof, and specifically prohibiting them from using, or reformulating for intended use, the product in the home and garden field; and

(e) Some of these contracts further restrict the use and sale of the diethyl-containing products to the United States.

13. Chemagro has entered into approximately 22 contracts in which it agrees to sell diethyl to the other party to the contract and to grant it a license under the Bayer patent with the following restrictions and limitations:

(a) The purchaser is to use the diethyl it purchases from Chemagro only in treating cottonseeds;

(b) The purchaser is not to use the diethyl for any other purpose, nor sell diethyl, as such, to any other person;

(c) The purchaser is to sell the diethyl-impregnated cottonseed only for use by commercial growers; and

(d) Such cottonseed must be used or sold for use only in the United States.

14. Chemagro has entered into approximately 19 contracts in which it agrees to sell diethyl to the other party to the contract and to grant it a license under the Bayer patent with the following restrictions and limitations:

(a) The purchaser is to use diethyl only to formulate dry, granule particles impregnated with a soil fungicide and diethyl;

(b) The purchaser is not to use the diethyl sold it for any other purpose, nor is it to sell diethyl, as such, to any other person; and

(c) The purchaser is to sell such treated particles only for use by commercial growers.

15. Chemagro has entered into approximately 9 contracts in which it agrees to sell diethyl to the other party to the contract and to grant it a license under the Bayer patent with the following restrictions and limitations:

(a) The purchaser is to use diethyl only to formulate dry fertilizer particles impregnated

with diethyl to a concentration not to exceed 1%;

(b) The purchaser is not to use the diethyl sold it for any other purpose, nor is it to sell diethyl, as such, to any other person; and

(c) The purchaser is to sell the diethyl impregnated fertilizer only for use in the home and garden field.

16. Chemagro has entered into one contract substantially identical to that described in the preceding paragraph, with the exception that the dry fertilizer particles are to be impregnated with diethyl to a concentration not exceeding 2%. This contract further restricts the purchaser to selling the product for use only in the United States.

17. Chemagro has entered into approximately 3 contracts in which it agrees to sell diethyl to the other party to the contract and to grant it a license under the Bayer patent with the following restrictions and limitations:

(a) The purchaser is to use diethyl only to formulate a pesticide;

(b) The purchaser is not to use the diethyl sold it for any other purpose, nor is it to sell diethyl, as such, to any other person;

(c) The purchaser is to sell the pesticidal product only for home and garden use; and

(d) The purchaser is to sell the pesticidal product only for use in the United States.

18. Chemagro has entered into approximately 12 contracts in which it agrees to sell 2% diethyl-containing granules to the other party to the contract and to grant it a license under the Bayer patent only to repackage and resell such granules for home and garden use.

VI. EFFECTS

19. The effect of the aforesaid contracts is or may be:

(a) To limit and prevent competition among Chemagro's vendees, and between them and Chemagro, in the sale and distribution of diethyl-containing products;

(b) To prevent and restrain Chemagro's vendees and the customers of such vendees from using and re-selling diethyl and diethyl-containing products;

(c) Unreasonably to restrain trade and commerce in diethtyl and diethyl-containing products; and

(d) Otherwise to deprive the public of the benefits of free and open competition.

PRAYER

Wherefore, the plaintiff prays:

1. That, pursuant to Section 5 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 5) the Court order summons to be issued to Chemagro, the defendant not found within the District of Columbia, commanding it to appear and answer the allegations contained in the complaint, and to abide by and perform such orders and decrees as this Court may make in the premises;

2. That the aforesaid contracts and combination or combinations be adjudged and decreed unlawful and in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act;

3. That defendants be perpetually enjoined from maintaining, by contract, understanding, or refusal to sell, any restriction on the use to which diethyl purchased from defendants, or from any licensee under the Bayer patent, may be put, and to whom,

for what purpose, or where diethyl-containing products may be sold or used;

4. That plaintiff have such other, further, general, and different relief as the nature of the case may require and the Court may deem proper in the premises;

5. That the plaintiff recover the costs of this suit.

RAMSEY CLARK,
Attorney General.
DONALD F. TURNER,
Assistant Attorney General.
ROBERT B. HUMMEL,
LIONEL KESTENBAUM,
RICHARD H. STERN,
THOMAS R. ASHER,
JAMES H. WALLACE,
Attorneys, Department of Justice.
DAVID G. BRESS,
U.S. Attorney.

Dated:

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1968

No. 504

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER AG, *Appellant*,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *Appellee*.

Nos. 505, 838 Misc. and 839 Misc.

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER AG, *Petitioner*,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *Respondent*.

On Various Motions and Petitions to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

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REPLY MEMORANDUM OF FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER AG

Of Counsel:

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10005

WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING
900 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

ALLEN F. MAULSBY
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10005

ARNOLD M. LERMAN
MAX O. TRUITT, JR.
DANIEL K. MAYERS
900 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Attorneys for Farbenfabriken Bayer AG

November 6, 1968

WILSON - EPES PRINTING CO. - RE 7-6002 - WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

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REPLY MEMORANDUM OF FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER AG

This case is one of the first two Government anti-trust cases in which service has been attempted under

Section 293. It is the *only* case in which the maneuver has been tried where a patent was not challenged. It is in every sense a test case for a new—and, we believe, unwarranted—expansion of a service of process provision to apply to numerous types of actions. The district court itself recognized the uncertainty of its holding by acknowledging the existence of "substantial ground for difference of opinion" on the question decided. The serious doubt as to the correctness of the district court's decision and the significance of the jurisdictional question are compelling enough reasons for review now.

There is, moreover, an earthy and practical problem here that the Government ignores. If the district court was wrong, then the entire forthcoming antitrust trial will go for naught, even should the Government prevail. If Bayer was not properly served, then any judgment against it must eventually be reversed and the action against it dismissed. Once Bayer is out of the case, Chemagro will be entitled to reversal as well, for the Government was able to drag Chemagro into the District of Columbia—a district with which it has no connection—only by using Section 5 of the Sherman Act. Thus, the time, money and energy of both defendants, of the Government, and most important, of the judicial system, will have been wholly wasted. The suit presumably will begin all over again against Chemagro in Kansas City where Chemagro may properly be served and tried and where the action should have been brought in the first place.

Chemagro is, in fact, the real defendant in this case. All of the contracts alleged to be illegal are contracts entered into by Chemagro; Bayer has no connection with them, and none is alleged. Indeed, all that is alleged with respect to Bayer is that it combined with Chemagro and participated in Chemagro's violation because it gave an exclusive license to Chemagro (which the Government does not challenge), and because it is Chemagro's parent (deriving revenues from and exercising voting control over Chemagro).* To compel Bayer to submit to discovery and undergo a trial without an initial determination of the power of the district court over Bayer (and to subject Chemagro thereby to a fruitless suit 1,500 miles from its Kansas City home) is manifestly unfair in the circumstances of this case.

Common sense, and the objective of "just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action," Rule 1, Fed. R. Civ. P., dictate that the district court's decision be reviewed in advance of trial. The Government, however, takes the position that there is no way to review the decision of the district court—even if it is grossly wrong—except by an appeal to this Court after a trial and the entry of a final decree. But im-

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* In its Memorandum, the Government fails to state that the grant of a license and its parental relationship are the only ways in which Bayer is even alleged to have "combined" with Chemagro or "participated" in the violation. In fact, Bayer did not even have a controlling interest in Chemagro during practically all of the time period covered by the complaint. (R. 14 in No. 504)

mediate review of the question presented by this case is altogether proper under existing law:

1. This Court's power under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 to review the district court's order is undisputed. This case is singularly appropriate for such review. The question of the district court's jurisdiction under Section 293 is novel, and will obviously be a recurring one. The expansion of jurisdiction over non-resident patent holders is precisely the type of extraordinary situation warranting the use of an extraordinary writ.

2. Alternatively, review is available under 28 U.S.C § 1292(b), which created a mechanism for prompt determination of close and controlling issues where such determination would hasten the end of the litigation. Section 1292(b) seeks the same objective as the Expediting Act and should be construed as complementary to it. The language of the Section supports such a construction; the legislative history does not indicate that Congress intended to exclude Government antitrust cases from the general jurisdiction affirmatively conferred by that language; nor does any reported case so hold.

The Court should note probable jurisdiction or grant certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

ALLEN F. MAULSBY
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10005

ARNOLD M. LERMAN
MAX O. TRUITT, JR.
DANIEL K. MAYERS
900 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Attorneys for Farbenfabriken Bayer AG

Of Counsel:

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10005

WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING
900 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

November 6, 1968

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1968.

FARBENFABRIKEN BAYER A. G. *v.*
UNITED STATES.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

No. 504. Decided November 25, 1968.

PER CURIAM.

The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed.